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Abstract    
This paper revisits, from a new angle, some of the debates over the relativism of the 
“Sociology of Scientific Knowledge” (=SSK). The new angle is provided by recent work on 
relativism in epistemology and the philosophy of language. I defend three theses. First, SSK-
relativism is not an instance of Paul Boghossian’s well-known “template” for relativism. 
Second, SSK-relativism is therefore not directly threatened by arguments targeting this 
template position. And third, SSK-relativism is nevertheless in the vicinity of this template, 




This paper revisits the relativism of the “Sociology of Scientific Knowledge” (=SSK) in light of 
recent work on relativism in epistemology and the philosophy of language. Many authors 
have contributed to SSK; I shall focus primarily on the writings of the Edinburgh sociologists 
Barry Barnes and David Bloor, as well as my own previous contributions.  
 
Relativism in SSK plays two roles: as a substantive position and as a methodology. The latter 
role is summed up in the “impartiality” and “symmetry” tenets of the “strong” programme 
of SSK: 
 
It [i.e. the “strong programme”] would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, 
rationality or irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will 
require explanation. 
   
It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of cause would 
explain say, true and false beliefs. (Bloor 1991, 7; italics added.) 
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The substantive position is summed up in the following passage: 
 
For the [SSK-] relativist there is no sense attached to the idea that some standards or 
beliefs are really rational as distinct from merely locally accepted as such. … [He] thinks 
that there are no context-free or super-cultural norms of rationality … (Barnes and 
Bloor 1982, 27) 
 
I shall focus primarily on the substantive position, and try to defend three theses. First, SSK-
relativism is not an instance of recently-much-debated “templates” for relativism. Second, 
SSK-relativism is therefore not threatened by arguments targeting these template positions. 
And third, SSK-relativism is nevertheless in the vicinity of these templates, and it offers 
noteworthy sketches of arguments for original relativist claims. In speaking of “recently-
much-debated ‘templates’ for relativism”, I am referring primarily to ideas introduced in 
Paul Boghossian’s 2006-study Fear of Knowledge (subsequently “FK”). I shall structure my 
investigation into SSK-relativism around Boghossian’s template for relativism. In so doing I 
also address his arguments for and against positions that instantiate his template.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 explains Boghossian’s 
template and its three tenets. For each tenet FK first either reports or invents a relativist 
argument in its favour, before subsequently marshalling an absolutist rejoinder. Sections 3 
to 5 outline and evaluated the case for SSK-relativism relative to Boghossian’s template and 
arguments.  
 
2. Boghossian’s Template 
 
Boghossian formulates epistemic relativism as a combination of three theses: 
 
(I) There are no absolute facts about what belief a particular item of information 
justifies. (Epistemic non-absolutism) 
 
(II) If a person, S’s, epistemic judgements are to have any prospect of being true, we 
must not construe his utterances of the form “E justifies belief B” as expressing 
the claim [i.e. the proposition] E justifies belief B but rather as expressing the 
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claim: According to [the] epistemic system, that I, S, accept, information E justifies 
belief B. (Epistemic relationism) 
 
(III) There are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems, 
but no fact by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than any of 
the others. (Epistemic pluralism) (FK 73) 
 
Note concerning relationism that it is couched in terms of a non-relativistic notion of truth. 
What is relativized in (II) is not truth but the content of the proposition. Using the language 
of today’s philosophy of language, epistemic relationism is thus a form of “(semantic) 
contextualism”, not of “(semantic) relativism” (cf. MacFarlane 2014). (II) also introduces the 
central concept of “epistemic system” (subsequently “ES”). An ES is made up of “epistemic 
principles,” such as “Observation”: “For any observational proposition p, if it visually seems 
to S that p and circumstantial conditions D obtain, then S is prima facie justified in believing 
p” (FK 84). Finally, epistemic pluralism (=III) is tantamount to the thesis of “equal validity”: 
“There are many radically different, yet ‘equally valid’ ways of knowing the world …” (FK 2).  
 
2. 1. The Argument for Non-Absolutism 
 
According to Boghossian, epistemic absolutism and relativism agree on the internalist 
assumption that “… if there are absolute epistemic facts, it must be possible to come to 
have justified beliefs about what those facts are” (FK 75). Boghossian’s crucial testcase are 
facts concerning the superiority of one ES over another. Boghossian’s absolutist assumes, 
and his relativist denies, that we can have epistemically justified beliefs about how our ES 
compares with others. The relativist’s denial is based on the following argument (FK 95-
102) which I here present in my own words: 
 
Step 1:  We encounter “genuine alternative” ESs. To be a genuine alternative to our ES, 
another ES must differ from ours in at least one “fundamental” epistemic 




Step 2:  When we encounter a genuine alternative to our ES, say “ESalt”, we are obliged 
to justify why we stick to our own ES rather than switch to ESalt (if that is what 
we choose to do). Call this obligation the “demand for justification.” 
 
Step 3:  In responding to the demand for justification, we have no choice but to rely 
upon the resources of our existing ES: after all, it is the only ES we have got. I 
shall refer to this idea as “ethnocentric justification”: epistemic justification of 
one’s own ES cannot but be based upon this very system. 
 
Step 4:  Alas, our ES features an epistemic principle, “no-rule-circularity,” which blocks 
the ethnocentric justification of our ES. According to “no-rule-circularity” the 
justification of a given epistemic rule R must not involve this very R. 
Generalized for the present case: the justification of our ES must not—on pain 
of violating no-rule-circularity—use the epistemic resources of our ES. 
 
Step 5:  It follows from Step 4 that we cannot have justified beliefs about the epistemic 
standing of our ES relative to other ESs. 
 
Step 6:  Finally, reading Step 5 in the context of the internalist assumption (“… if there 
are absolute epistemic facts, it must be possible to come to have justified 
beliefs about what those facts are”), we must conclude that there are no 
absolute epistemic facts, and that epistemic relativism is true.   
 
Boghossian is unconvinced. He insists that the demand for justification (Step 2) applies only 
when we encounter an alternative “impressive enough to make us legitimately doubt the 
correctness of our own epistemic system” (FK 101). And no-rule-circularity (Step 4) only 
holds for epistemic principles that have independently become doubtful (FK 100). 
Moreover, and this speaks against both no-rule-circularity and the demand for justification, 
“each thinker is blindly [default] entitled … to use the epistemic system he finds himself 
with, without first having to supply an antecedent justification for the claim that it is the 
correct system” (FK 99). And finally, Boghossian also gives us the right to dismiss alternative 
ESs that fail to live up to our demands of “coherence” (FK 96-7). – If Boghossian is on the 
right track, then Steps 2 and 4 of the relativistic argument are all false.  
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2.2. The Argument for Relationism 
 
Boghossian has the relativist and absolutist agree that ESs consist of “general epistemic 
principles” which “entail” “particular epistemic judgements.” I have already cited the 
general epistemic principle of Observation above, here is an example for a particular 
epistemic judgement: “If it visually seems to Galileo that there are mountains on the moon, 
then Galileo is justified in believing that there are mountains on the moon …” (FK 85)  
 
Following Gilbert Harman (1996), Boghossian formulates relationism by way of a parallel 
with “relativism in physics,” that is, for instance the relativisation of movement to 
frameworks in Galileo’s physics. On this reconstruction, the un-relativized claim “The ship 
moves” is “untrue”, that is, either false or incomplete. But the relativized claim, “The ship 
moves relative to framework F” is complete and truth-apt. Mutatis mutandis for 
epistemology: ‘Otto’s belief in ghosts is unjustified’ is untrue. And yet, the relativized claim 
‘Otto’s belief in ghosts is unjustified according my ES’ is complete and truth-apt. In other 
words, physical and epistemic relativism are cases of “replacement relativism”: un-
relativized expressions need to be replaced with relativized expressions (FK 83-87). 
 
Boghossian’s criticism focuses on the relationship between general epistemic principles and 
particular epistemic judgements (that, as long as they are un-relativized, are held to be 
untrue by the relativist). Boghossian allows the relativist different options for fleshing out 
general epistemic principles and un-relativized epistemic judgements. The former may be 
thought of as either general propositions or imperatives; and the latter may be rendered—
as we have already seen—as either false or incomplete. Boghossian tries to show that none 
of these renderings works. 
 
Option A (FK 91-93): general principles are general imperatives; particular unrelativized 
judgement are untrue. Here we are to think of general imperatives as ordering us to believe 
p only if we have the right kind of evidence. According to Option A, (*) ‘Otto’s belief in 
ghosts is unjustified’ needs to be replaced by something like (+) ‘According to the system of 
general epistemic imperatives that I accept, Otto’s belief in ghosts is unjustified.’ – Option A 
runs into difficulty with the intuitive and pre-theoretical thought that judgements like (*) (in 
their un-relativized form) are “normative”; they express the thought that Otto ought not to 
believe in ghosts. Whatever the relativist offers as a replacement for (*), FK maintains, it 
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ought to preserve this normative character. Unfortunately, (+) does not do so. (+) is not a 
claim about what anyone ought to believe; it is a claim about what a particular ES counts as 
epistemically justified. (+) is a descriptive and not a normative statement. 
  
Option B (85-89): general principles are general propositions; particular un-relativized 
judgements are untrue. This does not get rid of the problem with normativity. (*) would be 
replaced with ($) ‘According to the system of general epistemic propositions that I accept, 
Otto’s belief in ghosts is unjustified.’ The replacing proposition fails to preserve the 
normativity of (*). 
 
Option C (FK 85-86): general principles are general propositions; particular un-relativized 
epistemic judgements are false. This causes further problems for the advocate of 
relationism. If particular un-relativized are false, Boghossian holds, then so are epistemic 
principles qua general propositions. This is because particular epistemic judgements like (*) 
and epistemic principles like Observation are propositions “of much the same type” (FK 86): 
“the epistemic principles … are just more general versions of particular epistemic 
judgements” (FK 86). Can the relativist bite the bullet and declare general un-relativized 
principles false? No. This move faces the “endorsement problem”: how can we possibly 
endorse an ES that consists of nothing but false principles? 
 
Option D (FK 87-89):  general principles are general propositions; un-relativized particular 
epistemic judgements are incomplete. Here too the relativist faces the endorsement 
problem: if particular epistemic judgements are incomplete, then so are the general 
epistemic principles qua propositions. D must treat both as propositions “of much the same 
type.” But saying that one endorses a system of incomplete principles makes little sense. To 
make matters worse, D also owes us an account of how an incomplete general principle can 
entail particular judgements.  
 
Summa summarum, Boghossian believes that the relativist argument in favour of rela-





2.3 The Relativist Argument for Pluralism 
 
I have already mentioned the distinction between “fundamental” and “derived” epistemic 
principles. A fundamental principle is one “whose correctness cannot be derived from the 
correctness of other epistemic principles” (FK 67). Recall also the idea of a “genuine 
alternative to our ES”: such alternative differs from our ES in at least one fundamental 
principle. Boghossian’s relativist argues for pluralism by offering plausible historical 
instances of such alternatives. Such cases are meant to be intuitively plausible cases of 
“equal validity.” 
 
One often cited case is the clash between Galileo Galilei and Cardinal Roberto Bellarmine 
(Feyerabend 1975, Rorty 1981). Boghossian’s relativists describe Galileo’s and Bellarmine’s 
disagreement as follows. Bellarmine’s ES included the fundamental epistemic principle 
“Revelation”: “For certain propositions p, including propositions about the heavens, 
believing p is prima facie justified if p is the revealed word of God as claimed by the Bible” 
(FK 69). Galileo’s ES did not feature Revelation, and nor does ours today. Bellarmine’s ES 
was thus a genuine alternative to Galileo’s and our ES(s). Moreover, since Revelation was 
fundamental for Bellarmine, we cannot dislodge it by arguing that is fails to follow from 
other principles Bellarmine accepted. Ergo: we have no way of refuting Revelation in a non-
question-begging way. But then, so the relativist reasons, it seems that Bellarmine’s ES is as 
valid as is our own (FK 69).  
 
Boghossian’s criticism questions whether Bellarmine’s ES really is a genuine alternative to 
Galileo’s and our own. Boghossian tries to make the case for a negative reply by arguing 
that—on grounds of interpretational charity—we had better not regard Revelation as a 
fundamental epistemic principle in Bellarmine’s ES: 
 
Step I:  If another ES is incoherence, then we must reject it out of hand. (FK 96) 
 
Step II:  An ES is incoherent if it features epistemically unprincipled, arbitrary 
distinctions. If two propositions are treated epistemically differently, then 
the ES must provide a rationale for this asymmetry. (FK 98) 
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Step III:  Assume Revelation were a fundamental epistemic principle in Bellarmine’s 
ES. In that case, Bellarmine’s ES featured an epistemically unprincipled, 
arbitrary distinction. It was incoherent (cf. Step II), and we must reject it (in 
line with Step I).  
 
Step IV:  Step III is justified by the following consideration. If Revelation had been 
fundamental for Bellarmine, then he would have used ordinary epistemic 
principles like Observation for “propositions about objects in his vicinity,” but 
Revelation for propositions “about the heavens.” Observation for “earthly 
matters,” Revelation for “the heavens.” This differential treatment of earthly 
and heavenly objects was unprincipled. What is worse, Bellarmine himself 
accepted that Observation is often important in forming judgements about 
the heavens: after all, Bellarmine “used his eyes to note that the sun is 
shining, or that the moon is half full, or that the clear night-time Roman sky is 
littered with stars.” Bellarmine thus accepted that “the heavens are in a 
physical space that is above us, only some distance away.” Boghossian 
concludes: “If all this is true, how could he think that observation is not 
relevant to what we should believe about the heavens, given that he relies on 
it in everyday life?” (FK 104) 
 
Step V:  We thus have a choice. If we assume that for Bellarmine Revelation is a 
fundamental principle, then his ES is incoherent and we have reason to reject 
it, and deny it the status of being as valid as our own. If we treat Revelation 
as a derived principle, then we avoid the incoherence. This is the option 
interpretational charity calls for. But then Bellarmine’s ES is not a genuine 
alternative to our own: it does not differ from ours in at least one 
fundamental epistemic principle.  
 
Step VI:   But how can treating Revelation as derived rather than fundamental avoid 
the incoherence? FK answers as follows: If Revelation is derived, then most 
plausibly it is accepted on the basis of evidence, say, evidence for the belief 
that the Bible is “the revealed word of the Creator of the Universe”. And if 
that evidence is strong, then “perhaps” there is reason “to override the 
evidence provided by observation.” (FK 104-5) 
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To sum up, as Boghossian has it, Pluralism is not supported by the example of Bellarmine’s 
ES. 
 
2.4 An Alternative Template 
 
Finally, and before turning to SSK, I want to flag Crispin Wright’s proposal on how to 
improve on Boghossian’s template (Wright 2008). As pointed out earlier, there are (at least) 
two ways of capturing semantically the relativization central to relativism: relativizing the 
semantic content of the proposition, or relativizing the truth-predicate. Boghossian does 
the former, Wright suggests the latter; terminologically, Boghossian commits the relativist 
to “(semantic) contextualism”, Wright to “(semantic) relativism” or “New-Age relativism”. 
The difference between these two positions can also be described by saying that 
contextualism operates with “thick propositions,” and semantic relativism with “thin 
propositions.” Compare the two rendering of the utterance “E justifies belief B”:  
 
(Thick proposition) According to ESi, that I, S, accept, information E justifies belief B.  
(Thin proposition) E justifies belief B.  
 
Wright’s alternative to the second element of Boghossian’s template can thus be 
formulated as follows: 
 
B*. Utterances of the form: “E justifies belief B” are not absolutely but relatively true. 
They express the “thin” proposition: E justifies belief B. Their truth-values are relative 
to the standards of different contexts in which the proposition is assessed. And there 
are many different such contexts. 
 
Wright thinks that his reconstruction deals the relativist a better hand than does 
Boghossian’s template. And yet, ultimately Wright too thinks that the relativist position is 
untenable. A first problem is an infinite regress. If particular epistemic judgements are 
merely relatively true, that is, true relative to an ES, and if – as Boghossian has argued – 
particular epistemic judgements and general epistemic principles are “of much the same 
type” (FK 86) – then general epistemic principles can also at best be relatively true. And if 
“being relatively true” means “being true relative to a set of epistemic principles,” then we 
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need second-order epistemic principles to account for the truth of first-order principles. 
Alas, in order to account for the relative truth of second-order principles, we need third-
order principle … And so on ad infinitum (2008, 388). 
 
The relativist might try to avoid the regress by suggesting that the relative truth of a given 
general epistemic principle means truth relative to, and determined by, all of the other 
existing (first-order) principles of a given ES. Wright is not impressed. His reason is (what I 
will call) the “adoption problem.” Assume the relativist is in a situation in which her existing 
epistemic principles do not yet commit her to either accepting or rejecting a given newly-
encountered epistemic principle (say of another ES). In such situation the relativist is 
dealing with principles “whose basic place in [her] … epistemic … system goes with their 
acceptance being effectively rationally or cognitively unconstrained” (Wright 2008, 388). 
Unfortunately for the relativist, this crucial condition cannot be met if the relative truth of 
an epistemic principle is determined by the rest of the epistemic principles that belong to 
the same ES. An epistemic principle that the relativist encounters for the first time, 
naturally is not (yet) part of her ES. But then, by the presently considered proposal, it is not 
even relatively true: it is relatively false. And if it is relatively false, then the relativist is not 
rationally or cognitively unconstrained in considering it: clearly, she ought not to accept it 
(ibid.). 
 
3. From Relationism to Communitarian Finitism 
 
I now turn to relating Boghossian’s and Wright’s templates and arguments to SSK. I shall 
begin with the semantic issues.  
 
SSK’s theorising about language draws on philosophical ideas that are not centre-stage 
when Boghossian and Wright discuss the semantic aspects of epistemic relativism. SSK’s 
semantic theorising draws on Wittgenstein “rule-following considerations” (subsequently 
“RFC”). One important aspect of this difference in starting point is that SSK does not offer 
reflections in terms of propositions. Bloor for one does not find propositions a useful tool 
when discussing meaning in the context of epistemic relativism. Obviously, given 
constraints of space, I cannot here present a conclusive case for Bloor’s, or my own, take on 
the RFC (cf. Bloor 1983, 1997; Kusch 2002, 2006). I shall be satisfied if I manage to state 
clearly what the SSK-option amounts to.  
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There are two main dividing lines with respect to rule-following and meaning: the first 
separates “individualists” from “communitarians.” The individualist maintains that we can, 
at least in principle, make sense of the idea that an individual I follows a rule R in total 
social isolation. For the communitarian, to make sense of rule-following and meaning, we 
have to study communal language-games in which rules and meanings are attributed to 
others. Moreover, to declare I a follower of R, is to give I a certain social status.  
 
The second fault-line in the literature on rule-following is the difference between 
“meaning-determinist” and “meaning-finitist” conceptions. The advocates of the former 
position believe that to follow R is to have a mental state, or behavioural disposition, 
determining which behaviour is correct. The meaning-finitist conceives of individual acts of 
following R as acts of extending an analogy with previously learnt exemplars of following R 
correctly. In new circumstances following R requires a decision concerning the question 
which behaviour counts as being most in line with past precedents. This decision will 
generally be based on a broad range of factors, of which past use is but one. In other words, 
past use alone underdetermines present and future use. 
 
SSK combines meaning-finitism with communitarianism. It thus holds that the attribution of 
meaning and rules to others is based on analogies with previously established precedents, 
as well as on negotiations and the formation of a (temporary) consensus.  Finally, SSK’s 
communitarian meaning-finitism is a form of semantic relativism: it says that there is not 
one correct way of extending an analogy with previously learnt exemplars. Different 
individuals or groups may develop language in different ways, and there is no “neutral” 
perspective from which one of these developments can be declared “right,” “correct” or 
“true” in an absolute sense. 
 
The above sketch suffices as background for discussing how SSK would respond to 
Boghossian’s and Wright’s semantic arguments. I shall begin with Boghossian. Remember 
that he commits the relativist to the idea that utterances of the form “E justifies B” are 
candidates for truth only if they are taken to express the claim “According to the ES, that I, 
S, accept … E justifies … B.” Moreover, if the utterance “E justifies B” is taken to express 
merely the claim or the proposition “E justifies B,” then the utterance is false or incomplete. 
 12 
Boghossian goes on to show that this view runs into problems with normativity, 
endorsement and entailment. 
 
How could SSK respond? To begin with, it should deny that the utterance “E justifies B” 
expresses the claim or proposition According to the ES, that I accept, E justifies B. After all, 
SSK takes its lead from Wittgenstein who urges us to focus on how expressions are used; 
and, as Boghossian reminds us, the two formulations have different uses. The first has a 
normative use, the second does not. Of course, this is not yet a fully convincing answer to 
Boghossian; the SSK-theorists must explain how they can avoid having to formulate their 
semantic view in the way Boghossian suggests.  
 
First, it is not obvious that – given Boghossian’s own premises – the absolutist can avoid the 
problems with normativity, endorsement and entailment (cf. Kusch 2009). To see this, we 
need to ask: Why is only the relativist obliged to insist that the allegiance to a specific ES 
has to be made explicit? Doesn’t the absolutist too have an ES? This system may well be (in 
the eyes of the absolutist) the one and only correct system, but a system it is nevertheless. 
If that is true, however, then, by Boghossian’s lights, the absolutist must also commit to 
saying that the utterance “E justifies B” is truth-apt only if it expresses the claim According 
to ES … E justifies B. Moreover, and still following Boghossian’s reasoning mutatis mutandis, 
the absolutist also has reason to take the claim E justifies B to be incomplete or false. After 
all, it is a claim that fails to declare allegiance to the one correct ES. Once this much is 
accepted, the dialectic advantage of absolutism over relativism disappears. If Boghossian’s 
anti-relationist arguments work against relativism, then they also work against absolutism. 
This should make it doubtful, even to the absolutist, that Boghossian’s reflections on 
relationism can be on the right track.  
 
Second, SSK-theorists do not accept the key premise of Boghossian’s rendering of 
relationism, to wit, that the conditions of the possibility of an utterance are part and parcel 
of the claim the utterance expresses. For the utterance “E justifies B” to be meaningful and 
truth-apt there has to be a context consisting of previously socially-accepted precedents, a 
social group with its interests, values and forms of linguistic and epistemic negotiations, 
and the possibility of a consensus on questions of correctness. But this complex context is 
not part of the claim expressed. Here the SSK theorist can draw on Wright for support. As 
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we saw, Wright is also unconvinced by Boghossian’s way of packing the context of an 
utterance into the relevant proposition.  
 
Third, Boghossian is obviously guided by the thought that prima facie someone expressing 
an un-relativised proposition is thereby committing to absolutism. This is why he thinks the 
relativist has to insist that “according to ES …” must be added to mark the relativistic 
rendering. SSK-theorists qua communitarian finitists find this far from obvious. “E justifies 
B” has its uses in specific (types of) (epistemic) language-games. But these language-games 
can be played without committing to either absolutism or relativism. That is to say, the 
form of the utterance “E justifies B” does not tell us anything the speaker’s absolutist or 
relativist commitments. Where the speaker stands with respect to relativism or absolutism 
can only be determined by inquiring about their philosophical views. 
 
Turning from Boghossian to Wright, SSK-theorists can accept his idea that, for the relativist, 
claims of the form “E justifies B” are relatively true – at least when the relevant contexts 
consist of precedents, negotiations and consensus-formation. And this can be done without 
falling foul of infinite regresses or the adoption problem. 
 
Take first the objection that New-Age relativism involves an infinite regress. For SSK-
theorists, claims of the form “E justifies B” are true relative to epistemic precedents and 
negotiations; these precedents are true relative to further epistemic precedents and 
negotiations … and so on. Is this a vicious infinite regress? There is indeed an infinite 
regress here, but it is not vicious. For the SSK-theorists such regress in simply an expression 
of our historical contingency. Historians of science try to understand the history of the 
processes in which precedents are established and abandoned. There are no first and 
absolute beginnings to this sequence. When we pass epistemic judgements today, we do so 
in light of the precedents and negotiations we find ourselves with. We do so without 
worrying about the potential infinite regress that would result from if we aimed for an 
“ultimate” justification by running back along the historical sequence. Put differently, to 
couch the historical contingency as an infinite regress is to adopt the absolutist position – it 
is not an argument for it.  
 
SSK-theorists also have an answer to the adoption problem. To avoid the infinite-regress-
problem, Wright allows the New-Age relativist to say that a relatively true principle is one 
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that the rest of your ES commits you to; and that a relatively false principle is one that the 
rest of your ES does not commit you to. This then allows Wright to highlight a difficulty with 
respect to those newly-encountered principles concerning which your ES is not committed 
either way. Wright’s relativist takes herself within her right to adopt such principles at her 
pleasure. And yet, given the definition of “relatively false,” the newly-encountered 
principles would be false relative to the existing ES.  
 
Wright’s argument is easily blocked. The key move it do insist that for a principle p to be 
relatively false is not for the rest of the ES to lack any commitment concerning p, but for the 
rest of the ES to involve a commitment against p. In other words, lack of a system-
commitment concerning p is not a system-commitment against p. What then should the 
SSK-relativist say about newly-encountered principles concerning which her ES contains no 
commitments? She should say that the relevant group of epistemic agents needs to make a 
decision: Does adopting the new principle facilitate epistemic practices? Does it increase 
overall coherence of the ES? Does it chime with epistemic or other values, or interests of 
various kinds? If the answer to these questions is positive, then the ES will likely be adjusted 
in such a way that it does involve support for the newly-encountered precedent.  
 
To sum up the discussion of relationism and New-Age relativism, the semantic views of SSK 
differ from both of the views attributed to epistemic relativism by Boghossian and Wright. 
And the arguments with which the two philosophers target relationism and New-Age 
relativism do not affect the communitarian finitism adopted by SSK.  
 
To conclude the discussion of finitism, note that it has also a wider implication concerning 
the framing of relativism. Central in Boghossian’s framing is the distinction between two (or 
more) “systems” of “fundamental” and “derived” rules or principles. Call this view 
“regularist foundationalism” to mark the fact that it centrally features a foundation of 
fundamental rules which enables one to rationally negotiate disagreements amongst 
empirical claims and derived rules. SSK-theorists are suspicious of such hierarchical and 
rule-centred picture of epistemic practices. SSK follows Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) well-known 
case for the priority of exemplars over rules. That is to say, SSK replaces regularist 
foundationalism with a position one might call “finitist coherentism”: instead of 
foundational and derived rules, SSK talks of finite numbers of precedents or exemplars. 
Precedents or exemplars are at the centre of a web of beliefs, values, preferences, actions 
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and instruments. But this does not mean that they are sacrosanct: all it means is that in 
general actors seek to protect the exemplars from change. Actors prefer to make changes 
elsewhere in the web.  
 
4. Pluralism Reconstructed 
 
I now turn to contrasting Boghossian’s and SSK’s take on Bellarmine. I have three main 
comments. The first concerns historical accuracy. If we are to use historical events as 
material against which to test our philosophical theories then it is important that we get 
our facts straight. Remember in this light Boghossian’s argument that attributing to 
Bellarmine acceptance of Revelation as a fundamental principle is to saddle him with an 
incoherent system. Allegedly Bellarmine had no justification for letting Revelation trump 
Observation when it came to propositions about the heavens. Boghossian insists that 
arbitrary choices make a system incoherent. And incoherent systems should be rejected. 
 
This reasoning is based on ignorance of the actual historical context (Kinzel and Kusch 2018, 
Kusch 2017, cf. Biagioli 1993, Blackwell 1991, Finocchiaro 2007, Heilbron 2010). Bellarmine 
did have a twofold justification for using Revelation rather than Observation for certain 
propositions about the heavens. One reason was the millennia-old opposition between 
“sublunar” and “celestial” realms. According to the dominant astronomy and physics of the 
day, these two realms were governed by different laws of nature. Hence it was not 
arbitrary to think that these two realms might involve different epistemic sources, or at 
least the same sources to different degrees. Another reason was the equally old distinction 
between observables and unobservables. Given the astronomical and physical data 
available to astronomers in Bellarmine’s days, the movement of the Earth could not be 
observed. Nor could it be “demonstrated” by Aristotelian standards; such demonstrations 
required necessary premises. Bellarmine took the lack of observations and demonstrations 
in support of Copernicanism to justify doubts about its truth, and “in a case of doubt, one 
may not depart from the Scriptures as explained by the holy Fathers” (Bellarmine 1615). 
Needless to say, this is not a reasoning we today would accept. But this is not what is at 
issue at this point. The question here is simply whether Bellarmine’s uses of Observation 
and Revelation would have been arbitrary if he had thought of Observation as a 
fundamental principle. The answer to this question is “no”. 
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My second comment with respect to Boghossian’s discussion of Pluralism concerns the idea 
of “equal validity.” Boghossian commits epistemic relativism to the idea that all ESs are 
equally valid. One problem is that Boghossian fails to spell out what exactly “valid” means 
in this context. Does it mean “valid” in the logical sense? Or does it simply mean “true” or 
“justified”? A further problem is that Equal Validity is not generally a commitment that 
card-carrying epistemic relativists have been willing to take on. Barnes and Bloor have 
insisted on this point at least since 1982:  
 
Our … postulate … is not that all beliefs are equally true or equally false, but that … all 
beliefs without exception call[..] for empirical investigation and must be accounted for 
by finding the specific, local causes of [their] credibility (Barnes and Bloor 1982, 23). 
 
Similar denials can be found in other card-carrying epistemic relativists: Lorraine Code 
(1995, 202-3), Paul Feyerabend (1975, 189; 1978, 82-84; 1999, 215), Barbara Herrnstein 
Smith (2018, 26), or Hartry Field (2009, 255-6). Note also that Christopher Herbert 
concludes a lengthy discussion of the issue with the remark: “Nowhere does any ‘relativist’, 
to my knowledge, assert that all views are equally valid …”  (2001, loc. 440).  
 
Of course, absolutist critics of relativism need not be impressed with such denials. They 
may insist that Equal Validity is a tacit commitment of the relativist, a commitment that 
follows from other relativist tenets, tenets the relativist is ready to embrace openly. Maybe 
such argument can be constructed. But Boghossian makes no effort to do so.  
 
My third comment addresses the question what remains of the very idea of pluralism after 
we have moved from regularist foundationalism to particularist coherentism, and from 
Equal Validity to its rejection. One victim of these two moves is Boghossian’s (seemingly) 
clear and concise criterion for what constitutes a “genuine alternative” to a given ES: an ES 
that differs in at least one fundamental principle. This option is off the table when we give 
up regularist foundationalism. 
 
The main alternative to Boghossian’s pluralism, and the alternative SSK favours, is that 
there is more than one web of precedents, beliefs, values, interests, policies, and 
achievements, and that some such webs differ—and are indeed perceived by their 
respective actors to differ—in fundamental ways. It is hard to quantify such differences in a 
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general way; too many considerations potentially bear upon the question. Still, one rough 
indication of distance between two webs is the frequency or perceived ease of people 
“moving” from one such web to another. Another indication is the degree to which 
advocates of different webs find it important and useful to engage with one another in 
ways that both sides render as meaningful and reasoned debate. This is messier and more 
complicated than Boghossian’s snappy formula, but this is what our messy social and 
historical world requires. 
 
5. Non-Absolutism and Rule-Circularity 
 
To begin with, it is worth pointing out that for Bloor non-absolutism is the necessary and 
sufficient condition for relativism: “… relativism is the negation of absolutism. To be a 
relativist is to deny that there is such a thing as absolute knowledge and absolute truth.”. 
Absolute knowledge would be knowledge that is “perfect, unchanging, and unqualified by 
limitations of time, space, and perspective. It would not be conjectural, hypothetical, or 
approximate, or depend on the circumstances of the knowing subject.” (2011, 436-7)  
 
Bloor’s and Boghossian’s renderings of absolutism are similar enough for us to regard 
Bloor’s and other SSK-theorists’ arguments against absolute knowledge and absolute truth 
as considerations challenging Boghossian’s absolutism. There are five such arguments. I 
shall be brief regarding the first four since they do not directly challenge Boghossian’s 
reasoning. I mention them here only to indicate that the SSK-case for non-absolutism does 
not exclusively rest on critical reflections concerning rule-circularity.  
 
The first and “flagship” SSK-argument for non-absolutism is an induction on the history of 
science (e.g. Bloor 2011). SSK-theorists take it for granted that work on the history and 
sociology of science has shown that all systems of beliefs are ultimately based on but local 
and contingent causes of credibility.  
 
In conversations with SSK-theorists I have occasionally encountered a second line of 
thought against absolutism. It is an instance of what cognitive psychologists call the “tool-
to-theory heuristic” (Gigerenzer 1991). The starting point is the observation that non-
absolutism has proven a highly successful tool in history, sociology and cognitive science of 
science. The success of this tool needs an explanation. And the best explanation is that non-
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absolutism is the correct theory concerning the human epistemic and moral predicament. 
Non-absolutism is thus not just useful; it is true.  
 
A third SSK argument for non-absolutism is that it follows from “naturalism.” The naturalist 
theorist emphasizes that we cannot ever “transcend the machinery of our brains and the 
deliverances of our sense organs, the culture we occupy and the traditions on which we 
depend” (Bloor 2007, 252).  
 
A fourth SSK defence of non-absolutism targets self-proclaimed absolutists’ account of, or 
examples for, absolute facts or absolute knowledge. One concern here is that self-
proclaimed absolutists often take for granted that absolutism is the natural philosophical 
attitude and thus beyond the need for clarification. Boghossian’s book is a case in point. 
Although detailed and complex when it comes to characterizing relativism, FK says very 
little about (different ways to spell out) absolutism (Bloor 2007, 253). 
 
Finally, and fifth, I turn to considerations that SSK-theorists (might) direct against 
Boghossian’s reflections on what he takes to be the relativist’s best argument against 
absolutism. Note to begin with, that the issue of rule-circularity was mentioned already in 
Barnes and Bloor’s first relativist credo, their 1982-paper “Relativism, Rationalism, and the 
Sociology of Knowledge”:  
 
In the last analysis, he [the SSK relativist] will acknowledge that his justifications will 
stop at some principle or alleged matter of fact that only has local credibility. The only 
alternative is that justifications will begin to run in a circle and assume what they were 
meant to justify. (Barnes and Bloor 1982, 27; cf. Seidel 2013, 135).  
 
Is this (at least part of) the argument Boghossian is advancing on behalf of the relativist? 
Not quite: Barnes and Bloor are not arguing that since rule-circular reasoning is prohibited, 
we are unable to justify our ES. Rather their point is that allowing rule-circular reasoning 
does not avoid non-absolutism or relativism. That this is indeed what is meant is obvious 
from Bloor’s 2007-discussion of Boghossian’s defence of circular reasoning (in order to 
motivate absolutism). Bloor stresses that circular arguments are unable to establish—in a 
neutral way—the absolute superiority of our ES over others. If we allow ourselves to reason 
in a circular fashion, then we must grant the same option also to advocates of other, 
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alternative, ESs. Bloor applies these considerations also to the debate between absolutists 
and relativists: “if absolutists can use circular arguments to justify their position, then 
relativists can also avail themselves of this move.” Bloor invokes similar considerations 
against Boghossian’s “blind entitlement” (Bloor 2007, 261). 
 
Going beyond Bloor’s arguments, assume we have indeed been able to show—in rule-
circular fashion—that our ES is superior to another ES. Even rule-circularity to one side, why 
should such historically situated and contingent result give us the confidence that we are at 
least roughly on the road to absolute knowledge or absolute standards? Why think that our 
assessment transcends ultimate dependence upon local and contingent causes of 
credibility? Anyone impressed by the already-mentioned considerations in favour of non-
absolutism is unlikely to be persuaded otherwise by Boghossian’s thought-experiment.  
 
Given SSK’s Wittgensteinian sympathies, it is also worth pointing out an oddity about 
Boghossian’s “blind entitlement”. As Boghossian notes, he takes this idea to be inspired by  
§219 of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: “When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I 
obey the rule blindly.” I am not convinced that this is in the spirit of Wittgenstein’s position. 
Wittgenstein’s remark about obeying a rule blindly is not a remark about an entitlement. It 
is an observation about what we do. Moreover, while Wittgenstein, for instance in On 
Certainty frequently speaks about our “systems” of beliefs, he does not couch our 
relationship to such systems in terms of “entitlements.” Instead Wittgenstein speaks of this 
relationship as “something animal” (§359). And “something animal” does not sound like a 
platform from which to reach absolute standards.  
 
Finally, the issue of rule-circularity in epistemology—or “epistemic circularity”—has been 
discussed extensively in recent years. Thus even someone who agrees with SSK concerning 
Boghossian’s arguments might still suspect that SSK’s non-absolutism runs afoul of other 
epistemologists’ reflections on epistemic circularity. Obviously I cannot review here the rich 
literature on this topic. But I shall at least briefly comment on two epistemologists who 
have been central in this debate.  
 
I begin with William Alston (1982, 1991, 1993), and focus on the latter two book-size 
studies. Alston argues that we cannot know that our basic sources of beliefs are reliable. 
The best we can do is come to appreciate that they are “practically” without alternative for 
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us. This makes it “reasonable” for us to rely on them—at least when these practices are 
psychologically, historically and socially deeply embedded. Interestingly enough, for Alston 
“mystical perception” qualifies by these criteria. Does this kind of position threaten SSK’s 
non-absolutism? I think not. If practical reasonableness is the best we can get, then there is 
no reason to assume that we have justified beliefs about absolute epistemic principles—
something Boghossian takes to be possible. Indeed, that we are limited to this kind of 
merely practical endorsement is what some card-carrying relativists (e.g. SharonStreet 
2013) mean by their denial of absolutism.  
 
Ernest Sosa (2009) distinguishes between “animal” and “reflective” knowledge: the former 
is externalist-reliabilist; the latter internalist-coherentist: “awareness of how one knows” 
(2009, 200). Sosa believes that Alston is right only if we think of epistemic justification as 
linear. But it is “weblike” and delivers “mutually supportive comprehensive coherence.” 
And this enables a “reflective endorsement” of sources of belief. Our basic sources of belief 
are justified—in a non-circular fashion—insofar as they are based on our coherent 
“common sense and scientific knowledge of ourselves and the world” (ibid.). 
 
SSK-theorists would applaud the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, 
albeit Bloor emphasizes as the dividing criterion whether knowledge is based on social-
cultural resources or not. Bloor makes room for animal knowledge, knowledge not based 
on social cultural resources, even in humans (Bloor 1992). But Sosa’s attempt to deliver a 
non-circular justification for our basic sources of belief is unconvincing. If epistemology is 
part and parcel of our overall web of belief, it too will change: a point stressed in various 
ways by Feyerabend (1975) or Bas van Fraassen (2002). Nothing is in principle safe from 
revision. And this thought should make us sceptical about the prospects of reaching 
justified beliefs about absolute principles. Moreover, it is important to remember that 
there can be more than one coherent web of “common sense and scientific knowledge of 
oneself and the world.” Remember for example that Alston has a web of beliefs in which 
mystical perception has a legitimate place. Which one of the competing webs gets to decide 
on the fundamental epistemic sources? 
 
Finally, consider the “raft” (Sosa 1980) of our common-sense and scientific knowledge of 
ourselves and the world. How likely is it that this rafts drifts towards an ever better grasp of 
absolute epistemic principles? SSK follows Kuhn in thinking about the development of 
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science in evolutionary terms (Bloor 2007). But for Darwin evolution has no telos. Not to 
forget that for SSK the selecting environments are (natural-social-cultural) “niches” caused 
or constituted by our (collective) activities and beliefs. This kind of perspective give little 




In this paper I have tried to relate SSK-relativism to recent theorising about relativism in 
epistemology and the philosophy of language. I have tried to show that Boghossian’s 
template does not fit SSK-relativism and that SSK-theorists have a battery of arguments 
that threaten Boghossian’s absolutism. Whatever the merits or weaknesses of my 
individual arguments, I hope to at least have made plausible that the contemporary debate 
over epistemic relativism in Anglophone philosophy and the theorizing in SSK are not 
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